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Financial stability and competition in the Euro area 
 
 
 
  
Abstract 
The Euro area, the countries that have adopted the euro, is converging some more towards a 
banking union. Starting from 2014, the European Central Bank will become the single 
supervisor of the Euro zone biggest banks calling for a more integrated supervision.  
Despite the on-going process, there are few studies that focus on the relationship between 
bank stability and competition specifically for this economic block. Does competition affect 
the stability of Eurozone banks? Does banks’ financial stability increase/decrease in case of 
higher competition? Does the relationship hold in case of a financial crisis? We assess the 
dynamic relationship between competition and bank soundness for the Eurozone banks 
over the period 2002-2012. We find that bank stability increases with competition. 
Nonetheless, we find that during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, higher market power is 
associated with higher individual bank soundness. 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL-Classification: C23, G21 
Keywords: Bank stability, Eurozone banks, Competition, Generalized Methods of Moments, 
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1 Introduction 
The recent regulatory developments toward a more integrated European banking 
market introduce a single supervisor for Eurozone banks. It comes in response to the 2007-
2009 financial turmoil and to break the link between troubled banks and complacent 
national supervisors. On the one hand the international efforts have been coordinated 
toward the development of a new regulatory framework to control for systemic risks (e.g., 
Basel Committee's framework on global systematically important banks). On the other 
hand, there is an apparent need to strengthen the collaboration between national bank 
supervisors. This is an area that is not sufficiently covered by the existing literature as little 
is known about the relationship between bank stability and competition explicitly for Euro 
zone banks only. 
The nexus between competition and stability is paramount in many regards. Higher 
competition is often related to innovation and better prices for customers. Moreover, under 
a social welfare perspective, it reduces the deadweight loss induced by market power. On 
the other hand, competition reduces the “charter value” of banks in that causing a more 
unstable financial system (Allen and Gale, 2004). In addition, recent cross-country 
evidence on the relationship shows that other features such as market, regulatory and 
country characteristics play an important role (Beck et al., 2013). Nonetheless, empirical 
evidence remains elusive and does not focus explicitly on the Euro zone. This is surprising 
as the economic block appears to be more homogenous since the countries share the same 
currency. 
We estimate competition using the Lerner Index of Monopoly Power, recently used 
in various studies (Maudos and De Guevara, 2007; Carbò et al., 2009; Turk Ariss, 2010, 
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Radic et al., 2011, among many others). Market power is computed at individual bank level. 
We use panel data techniques and Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM), to control for 
endogeneity and country-specific effects, in order to test whether changes in competition 
predict variations in bank risk measures. We also control for the impact that various factors 
at the bank level have on the competition-risk relationship, such as bank-level fundamentals, 
herding behaviour, macroeconomic variables and the occurrence of the financial crisis. We 
also test the significance of the relationship between a measure of market structure in the 
loan market and bank stability. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature 
review and the research hypotheses. The econometric framework, the data and variables 
appear in section 3. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and robustness checks and 
section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Literature review and research hypotheses  
We empirically assess if an increase in competition is associated with higher instability 
of Eurozone banks. This topic is largely covered in commercial banking from both 
theoretical and empirical standpoints.  
From a theoretical perspective, there are two views concerning the impact of 
competition on financial stability. The ‘competition-fragility’ view (among others, Marcus, 
1984; Keeley, 1990; Allen and Gale, 2004; Beck et al., 2006; Matsuoka, 2013) argues that 
higher competition leads to more risk in banking and to the erosion of bank charter value. 
On the contrary, various papers support the idea that higher competition may transform the 
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nature of banking and induce banks to become more relationship-oriented (Boot and 
Thakor, 2000). As such, the ‘competition-stability’ view (Boyd and De Nicolò, 2005; De 
Nicolò and Lucchetta, 2009) contends the negative effects of concentration, claiming that 
the considerable market power of only few banks will cause them to raise the interest rate 
on loans, which will induce adverse selection (risky projects are financed) and moral hazard 
(risk shifting), with a negative impact on the stability of the banking system. 
Recently there has been a spurt in empirical studies trying to measure the effects of 
competition and market power on stability. Several works have tested the relationship 
between banking market structure and risk focusing on credit risk (Hakenes, and Schnabel, 
2010; Fiordelisi et al., 2011), interest rate risk (Delis and Kouretas, 2011) or the broader 
default risk (Repullo, 2004; Schaeck et al., 2009, Berger et al., 2009; Martinez-Miera and 
Repullo, 2010; Turk Ariss, 2010) providing mixed evidence. For instance, Boyd et al. 
(2006) and De Nicolò and Loukoianova (2007) show that financial instability increases in 
lower competitive markets, while Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) find opposite 
evidence (i.e., risk decreases as bank market power increases). Schaeck et al. (2009) 
analyse banks operating in 45 nations over 1980–2005 and find that more competitive and 
more concentrated banking systems are less likely to experience a systemic crisis and 
increase time to crisis.  Berger et al. (2009) analyse a large sample of banks in 23 
developed countries and observe that, even if an increase in bank market power lead to 
riskier portfolios, the effect on stability could be offset by a greater franchise value. In an 
attempt to reconcile the mixed empirical evidence, Beck et al. (2013) show that greater 
competition is generally associated with larger impact on banks’ risk-taking activities in 
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countries with stricter activity restrictions, more herding in revenue structure, less 
concentrated banking markets and more generous deposit insurance.  
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we focus on 
Eurozone banks. Second, similarly to Beck et al. (2013), we investigate the assumption that 
competition will have a stronger impact on bank stability in more homogeneous banking 
system (where herding behaviour is more likely). Third, we analyze whether the 
fundamental nexus holds in case of severe market turmoil. As such, we use as a natural 
experiment the occurrence of the 2007-2009 financial crisis and provide empirical evidence 
on the role of market power during an economic downturn. 
 
3 Empirical approach  
3.1 Data sources  
Bank financial statements are taken from Bureau van Dijk Bankscope database. We 
restrict our analysis to banks from the twelve countries that adopted the euro on the 1st 
January 2002 (i.e., Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) over the period 2002-2012. The 
distribution of the banks by year and country is reported in Table 1. 
< INSERT HERE TABLE 1 > 
We select all types of depository institutions (commercial banks, savings banks and 
cooperative banks). To avoid duplication, we consider consolidated data where it is 
possible and unconsolidated data otherwise.  We also delete banks for which relevant 
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information is not available (e.g., total assets). After data cleaning, our final sample consists 
of almost 22,700 observations for 2,527 individual banks distributed in the twelve countries. 
Table 2 reports the sample summary statistics of the main variables included in the analysis.  
< INSERT HERE TABLE 2 > 
Additional information on economic freedom is retrieved from The Heritage 
Foundation. Country-level data is collected through Eurostat and the World Bank. 
 
3.2 Measuring competition: the Lerner Index  
Following recent studies (Maudos and de Guevara, 2007; Casu and Girardone 2009; 
Turk Ariss, 2010, among many others), we estimate a non-structural measure of 
competition using the Lerner index of Monopoly Power (LER) to derive individual bank’s 
monopoly power. This Index represents the extent to which market power allows firms to 
fix a price above marginal cost and it is calculated as follows: 
p MCLER
p
−
=   ( 1 ) 
where p  is the price of the output and MC is the marginal cost. Higher values of the index 
imply greater market power. The price of output Q is calculated as total revenues (interest 
plus non-interest income) divided by total assets. Following some recent papers, we 
estimate the marginal cost using a translog cost function with two inputs, one single output 
and a time trend. The final specification is as follows: 
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( 2 ) 
where TC is total costs (the sum of personnel expenses, other administrative expenses and 
other operating expenses); Q is the banks’ single output proxied by total assets; P1 and P2 
are the price of the inputs employed in the production process: P1 is the price of labour (i.e., 
personnel expenses over total assets), and P2 is the price of physical capital (i.e., other 
operating expenses over total fixed assets). α, β, δ, γ, τ, ψ are coefficients to be estimated; εit 
is the error term. A panel data regression in a fixed effect model is used considering all 12 
countries over 2002-2012. 
From equation (2), the marginal costs can be derived as follows: 
 ( 3 ) 
We calculated the Funding Adjusted LER, as suggested by Maudos and de Guevara, 
(2007) and Turk Ariss, (2010): specifically, MC are derived from the estimation of the cost 
function that omits funding costs as one of the inputs. This enables us to account for market 
power that may have previously been exercised in the deposit market: specifically, by 
excluding funding costs, we obtain a clean proxy of pricing power that is not affected by 
market power which had previously originated in the deposit market while raising funds. 
Moreover, the Lerner Index is estimated at bank level, therefore the evolution of market 
power is analysed across banks over time. 
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3.3 Variables  
A comprehensive set of variables is considered in the analysis in order to control for the 
effect of other determinants on the relationship between competition and risk. These are 
included in the estimation to take into account both variables that can affect directly the 
relationship between stability and competition (heterogeneity, market concentration), and 
other factors that may explain bank financial soundness (bank-level fundamentals and 
environmental determinants).   
We proxy bank stability using the natural logarithm of the Z-Score (as, for instance, in 
Iannotta et al., 2007; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Beck et al., 2013). We compute the Z-score 
at bank level as: 
, , ,
,
( / )
( )
i t i t i t
i t
T
ROA E A
Z Score
ROAσ
+
− =   ( 4 ) 
where ROAi,t is the return on assets for bank i in year t, Ei,t/Ai,t denotes the equity to total 
assets ratio for bank i in year t, σ(ROAT) is the standard deviation of return on assets over 
the full sample period (T years). The Z-Score provides a measure of bank soundness as it 
indicates the number of standard deviations by which returns have to diminish in order to 
deplete the equity of a bank. A higher Z-Score implies a higher degree of solvency and 
therefore it gives a direct measure of bank stability. We consider in the analysis the natural 
logarithm of Z-score to smooth out higher values of the distribution. 
We compute the Herding Measure and the loan market concentration to control for the 
effects of other factors on the relationship between stability and competition. The Herding 
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Measure, as in Beck et al. (2013), is built as the within country standard deviation per year 
of non-interest income (e.g., fee commissions) as a share of total assets.  It takes into 
consideration the possible incentives for banks to increase their risk-taking following an 
increase in competition. The higher the value of this indicator, the more heterogeneous are 
the sources of revenues of Euro zone banks (i.e., less herding). We also compute a 
combined measure using the interaction between the herding indicator and the Lerner Index. 
The Herd-Lerner is estimated as the product of a dummy variable and the Lerner Index. 
The dummy takes value of one if the banking sector in a country is in the highest third of 
the Herding measure distribution (i.e., more heterogeneous sources of revenues), zero 
otherwise. 
The Hefindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI) conveys the information on market 
concentration on loans. The index is computed per year at country level.  The higher the 
value of HHI, the lower is the concentration of the market. We also calculate a combined 
measure using the Lerner Index. The HHI-Lerner is computed as the product of a dummy 
and the Lerner Index. The dummy takes value of one if the banking sector in a country is in 
the highest third of the HHI distribution (i.e., more concentrated markets), zero otherwise. 
We consider a set of control variables. The bank level-fundamentals comprehend 
liquidity, a credit risk measure and size. The liquidity ratio is built as cash and due from 
banks on total assets. It gives an indication on resources quickly available to cover cash 
outflows. The ratio of loan-loss provisions over loans provides information on the exposure 
to credit risk. The size variable, computed as the natural logarithm of bank total assets, 
accounts for the ability to diversify the business in that reducing the bank overall risk. The 
influence of the macroeconomic environment is proxied by the inflation rate, by the total 
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long term unemployment rate (12 months or more) and by the net total government lending. 
In addition, we employ the overall financial freedom index estimated by the Heritage 
Foundation. Higher values indicate greater economic freedom. Moreover, an interaction 
term is introduced to take into account the 2007-2009 financial crisis.  
< INSERT HERE TABLE 3 > 
 
3.4 Econometric approach  
In order to investigate the inter-temporal relationships between competition and stability, we 
estimate the following equation: 
Zi,t = f (LERi, t-1 , Xi, t-1, Ki,t-1) + εi,t ( 5 ) 
where the i subscript denotes the cross-sectional dimension across banks; t denotes the time 
dimension; LERi ,t-1 is the Lerner Index for bank i expressing bank market power; Xi are 
factors that we posit to influence the relationship between competition and stability, Ki,t-1 are 
control variables (as detailed in Section 3.3) and εi,t is the error term.  
To tackle potential problems related to endogeneity, we use the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimators developed for dynamic panel models (Arellano and Bover, 
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). Specifically we use the two-step system GMM estimator 
with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard error.1  
                                                 
1 The estimated asymptotic standard errors of the efficient two-step GMM estimator are severely downward biased in small samples 
therefore we correct for this bias using the method proposed by Windmeijer (2005).  
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4 Results  
Panel data regressions are run to investigate the dynamic relationship between financial 
stability and competition in Eurozone banks. The analysis aims at determining the causal 
effect of competition on financial stability. In addition, we are interested in understanding if 
the fundamental relationship has changed during the 2007-2009 financial turmoil. 
Moreover, it is analysed whether herding behaviour plays a role and if competition is also 
linked to a measure of market concentration in loans. 
We first run our base model considering a one year lag in the Lerner Index. Results, 
reported in Table 4, show that competition is positively related to individual bank stability, 
meaning that an increase in the banks’ monopoly power decreases bank resilience. This 
evidence will be in favour of the competition stability view and could potentially have 
some important policy implications. For instance, as the new recent developments in 
information technology is allowing new firms to enter the banking market, the single 
supervisory mechanism (i.e., ECB and national supervisory authorities) may look at ease 
some of the rules for market entrance. The bank-level fundamentals are strongly and 
negatively related to bank stability apart from the liquidity ratio. Loan-loss provisions 
decreases bank stability as high credit risk bites banks’ earnings. Interestingly, size is 
negatively related to bank soundness against the findings of many recent studies (i.e., Beck 
et al, 2013). This could suggest that the willingness to break up banks “Too-Big-To-Fail” 
may have empirical foundation in terms of individual bank stability. Inflation rate is 
positively related with bank stability though it is worth mentioning that the average across 
the sample for the whole period (1.79%) has been below the ECB target of 2% and there 
has not been any country or time period where we observe hyperinflation (e.g., inflation 
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higher than 10% ). The coefficients on long term unemployment and government net 
lending are negatively related to bank stability. Furthermore, the overall financial freedom 
shows also a negative relationship with individual bank stability. 
We run a second regression where we include in the analysis an interaction term to 
account for the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The negative relationship between market power 
and bank stability holds. What is more interestingly is that there is a positive relationship 
between the financial crisis interaction term and individual bank soundness meaning that 
banks with higher market power withstands the crisis better. 
< INSERT HERE TABLE 4 > 
We run two regressions to investigate the assumption that competition will have a 
stronger impact on bank stability in more homogeneous banking system (where herding 
behaviour is more likely). As such, we introduce the Herding measure and a combined 
measure obtained by interacting the Lerner Index with a dummy capturing the bank herding 
behaviour. As reported in Table (5), the herding measure is not statistically significant 
when introduced in the model. The Lerner Index keeps being negatively related to the Z-
Score supporting previous results. In Specification (2.2), we introduce the interaction term 
and find that the Herding Measure is negatively related to bank stability indicating that 
more homogenous markets (i.e., for low values of the Herding Measure) are related to 
higher bank soundness. In addition, the combined measure shows that in more homogenous 
markets with higher competition, financial stability is higher. Although diversification 
should be carefully considered by policy makers for its impact on the safety and soundness 
of the overall banking system, more homogenous banking markets seems to be related to 
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higher individual bank stability. The combined measure is strongly related to bank stability 
as the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level. Moreover, the results of the 
estimations are in line with previous ones after including in the analysis the herding 
measure.    
< INSERT HERE TABLE 5 > 
As robustness test, we use a measure of the market structure (loan concentration) to 
analyse its effect on bank stability over time. The one-year lagged Herfindhal-Hirschman 
Index is negatively related to bank soundness, implying that bank stability is higher in more 
concentrated markets: this is consistent with the previous findings suggesting that more 
competition is likely to happen in more concentrated markets.  
< INSERT HERE TABLE 6 > 
 
5 Conclusions  
The competition-stability nexus is an unsettled topic in the literature in banking. We 
provide a cross-country evidence that more competition favours individual bank stability in 
the EU-12. 
We estimate at individual level bank’s market power (Lerner Index). We also control 
for bank-level fundamentals and macroeconomic factors. In addition, we introduce a 
measure of market structure (Herfindhal-Hirschman Index) to test the robustness of the 
relationship.  
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We find that the lower the market power of individual banks, the higher their stability. 
This relationship seems to be reverted during systemic crises as in the 2007-2009 financial 
turmoil banks with higher market power were more financially sound. In addition, our 
results show that although market concentration is detrimental to bank stability, once we 
account for competition, the more the market power and the concentration in banking 
market the more the individual bank soundness. 
Our findings contribute to the understanding of the banking dynamics in the EU-12 
countries. As such, they are an important piece of evidence for the forthcoming European 
banking union. 
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Table 1 
Distribution of banks 
This table presents the distribution of banks by country and year over the sample period (2002-2012).  
 
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Austria 117 156 180 189 201 205 189 192 195 183 110 1,917 
Belgium 18 19 19 18 18 16 19 19 18 17 13 194 
Finland 0 2 2 1 0 2 2 3 3 2 2 19 
France 72 75 76 80 80 82 85 83 87 87 73 880 
Germany 1,166 1,137 1,148 1,423 1,446 1,453 1,456 1,451 1,450 1,445 1,080 14,655 
Greece 1 1 2 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 3 37 
Ireland 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 10 
Italy 3 0 1 448 458 470 477 479 495 496 389 3,716 
Luxembourg 39 39 42 42 46 50 50 51 51 48 30 488 
Netherlands 2 3 4 4 4 6 5 5 5 6 4 48 
Portugal 2 2 2 7 9 10 13 13 14 13 8 93 
Spain 5 5 9 71 75 65 73 82 78 78 64 605 
Total 1,425 1,439 1,486 2,288 2,342 2,364 2,374 2,383 2,402 2,382 1,777 22,662 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of our sample of European banks between 2002 and 2012 for the 
main variables used in the model. It is at first surprising the Lerner Index is negative for some observations 
though for 28 banks only. We argue that this could be the case when banks start operations and bear high fixed 
costs (e.g., for fixed assets).  
 
Variable Symbol Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Output Price P 22,662 0.0569 0.0410 -0.0340 2.4074 
Marginal Cost MC 22,662 0.0107 0.0214 0.0000 0.9787 
Lerner Index LER 22,662 0.8231 0.2659 -34.5083 1.0000 
Herding measure HERD 22,662 0.1317 0.1703 0.0000 1.7366 
Concentration HHI LOANS 22,662 0.0246 0.0505 0.0031 1.0000 
Z-Score Z 22,662 4.1788 3.6712 -12.1562 70.8005 
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Table 3 
Variables definition  
This table defines the variables used in the paper and the sources of data. 
 
Variables Symbol Definition and calculation method Source 
Z-score Z 
The ratio synthesizes a measure of overall banking risk. It is 
computed as the sum of the return on assets (ROA) and the equity 
ratio (equity over total assets) divided by the sample standard 
deviation of ROA. 
Own calculations using data 
from Bankscope. 
Lerner Index LER It represents the extent to which market power allows the bank to fix a price (P) above its marginal cost (MC). 
Own calculations using data 
from Bankscope. 
Output Price P 
Following recent studies (Berger et al 2009 and Turk Ariss 2010) 
and assuming that banks produce an heterogeneous flow of services 
that is proportional to their dimension, we use banks’ total asset as a 
proxy of their overall activity (Angelini and Cetorelli, 2003) and we 
estimate average price as total revenues (interest and non- interest 
income) on total asset. 
Own calculations using data 
from Bankscope. 
Marginal costs MC 
Marginal cost of the product is estimated using a single output 
translog cost function, firm-fixed effect to handle the average 
heterogeneity among banks and a technology shift trend to capture 
the average changing in production technology over the sample 
period. 
Own calculations using data 
from Bankscope. 
Liquidity LIQ Liquidity indicator computed as the ratio between cash and due from banks and total assets. 
Own calculations using data 
from Bankscope. 
Loan Loss 
Provisions LLPTL 
Credit risk indicator obtained as the ratio of loan-loss provisions 
over total loans. 
Own calculations using data 
from Bankscope. 
Bank Asset Size SIZE It is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Own calculations using data from Bankscope. 
Herding measure HERD 
This is a measure of banking industry heterogeneity obtained as the 
within country standard deviation of the percentage non-interest 
income (with respect to total assets) as in Beck et al. (2013),  per 
year (t) and per country (i). 
Own calculations using data 
from Bankscope. 
Inflation rate INFL The annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services. World Bank 
Long-term 
unemployment LTU 
It measures the long-term unemployment (12 months and more) in 
millions of people looking for a paid job. Eurostat 
Government 
lending GOV 
Net government lending minus net borrowing as a percentage of 
GDP. Figures are at general government level. Eurostat 
Overall Freedom OVERALL Overall measure of financial freedom. The Heritage Foundation. 
Financial Crisis  LERNFIN 
Interaction term obtained by moltiplicating a a dummy variable for 
the 2007-2009 financial crisis (it takes value of 1 in 2007-2009, 0 
otherwise) and the Lerner Index. 
Own calculations using data 
from Bankscope. 
Concentration  HHI LOANS 
Concentration Index (Herfindhal-Hirschman Index) calculated as the 
sum of the squares of the market shares (considering loans) of each 
bank (i) in a specific country (c) in a determined year (t). We 
consider one observation per year  (t) per country (c) (i.e. 60 values). 
Own calculations using data 
from Bankscope. 
Herd Lerner HERD_LERNER 
Mixed measure that combines the banks with the highest tendency to 
herd (i.e. lowest third of the distribution of HERD) with market 
monopoly power. 
Own calculations. 
Concentration 
Lerner HHI_LERNER 
Mixed measure that combines banks' concentration index in the loan 
market with market monopoly power. Own calculations. 
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Table 4 
The link between bank stability and competition in Eurozone banks 
The Table reports the results from the estimation of equation (5) to disentangle the inter-temporal relationships between bank stability 
(measured by the Z-score) and competition. We use the two-step GMM estimators developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer 
(2005) corrected standard error (reported in brackets). We report the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators and 
the Arellano–Bond test for autocorrelation. In the former, the null hypothesis is that instruments used are not correlated with residuals and so 
the over-identifying restrictions are valid. In the latter, we test the autocorrelation in first differences (AR1), the null hypothesis being no 
autocorrelation, and the autocorrelation in levels (AR2), the null hypothesis being again no autocorrelation.  All variables are summarized in 
table 1. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  The sample includes all the European 
banks in EU-12 over the period 2002-2012.  
 
  (1.1) (1.2) 
Dependent variable Z: Z-Score Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
LERt-1 -0.401** 0.188 -0.430** 0.205 
LERNFIN 
 
  0.050*** 0.008 
LIQt-1 0.052 0.367 0.051 0.364 
LLPTLt-1 -0.015*** 0.001 -0.015*** 0.001 
SIZEt-1 -0.114*** 0.007 -0.113*** 0.007 
INFLt-1 0.022*** 0.004 0.016*** 0.004 
LTUt-1 -0.056*** 0.005 -0.057*** 0.005 
GOVt-1 -0.004*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 
OVERALLt-1 -0.033*** 0.002 -0.032*** 0.002 
Intercept 5.503*** 0.209 5.469*** 0.214 
Observations: 19,998 19,998 
No. of banks 2,512 2,512 
Hansen test, 2nd step, χ(2), p-
value 0.693 0.389 
AB test AR(1), p-value 0.000 0.000 
AB test AR(2), p-value 0.143 0.136 
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Table 5 
The link between bank stability and competition in EU-12 banks:  
the herding behaviour  
The Table reports the results from the estimation of equation (5) to disentangle the inter-temporal relationships between bank stability (measured 
by the Z-score) and competition whilst accounting for banks’ herding behaviour. We use the two-step GMM estimators developed by Blundell 
and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard error (reported in brackets). We report the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions for the GMM estimators and the Arellano–Bond test for autocorrelation. In the former, the null hypothesis is that instruments used are 
not correlated with residuals and so the over-identifying restrictions are valid. In the latter, we test the autocorrelation in first differences (AR1), 
the null hypothesis being no autocorrelation, and the autocorrelation in levels (AR2), the null hypothesis being again no autocorrelation.  All 
variables are summarized in table 1. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  The sample 
includes all the European banks in EU-12 over the period 2002-2012.  
 
  (2.1) (2.2) 
Dependent variable Z: Z-Score Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
LERt-1 -0.445** 0.210 -0.391* 0.204 
LERNFIN 0.049*** 0.008 0.047*** 0.008 
HERDt-1 -0.040 0.028 -0.064** 0.028 
HERD_LERNERt-1    -0.060*** 0.006 
LIQt-1 0.046 0.366 0.103 0.353 
LLPTLt-1 -0.015*** 0.001 -0.015*** 0.001 
SIZEt-1 -0.113*** 0.007 -0.113*** 0.007 
INFLt-1 0.019*** 0.004 0.027*** 0.004 
LTUt-1 -0.058*** 0.005 -0.053*** 0.005 
GOVt-1 -0.005*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 
OVERALLt-1 -0.033*** 0.002 -0.032*** 0.002 
Intercept 5.505*** 0.215 5.422*** 0.214 
Observations: 19,998 19,998 
No. of banks 2,512 2,512 
Hansen test, 2nd step, χ(2), p-
value 0.382 0.035 
AB test AR(1), p-value 0.000 0.000 
AB test AR(2), p-value 0.130 0.085 
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Table 6 
 
The link between Bank stability and Competition in EU-12 banks: the concentration 
in the loan market 
The Table reports the results from the estimation of equation (5) to disentangle the inter-temporal relationships between bank stability (measured 
by the Z-score) and competition measured by the concentration in the loan market. We use the two-step GMM estimators developed by Blundell 
and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard error (reported in brackets). We report the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions for the GMM estimators and the Arellano–Bond test for autocorrelation. In the former, the null hypothesis is that instruments used are 
not correlated with residuals and so the over-identifying restrictions are valid. In the latter, we test the autocorrelation in first differences (AR1), 
the null hypothesis being no autocorrelation, and the autocorrelation in levels (AR2), the null hypothesis being again no autocorrelation.  All 
variables are summarized in table 1. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The sample 
includes all the cooperative banks in EU-12 over the period 2002-2012.  
 
  (3.1) (3.2) 
Dependent variable Z: Z-Score Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
LERt-1     -1.360*** 0.408 
HHI LOANSt-1 -1.524 1.307 -12.412** 5.944 
HHI_LERNERt-1    17.102*** 6.607 
LIQt-1 0.317 0.380 0.627 0.636 
LLPTLt-1 -0.014*** 0.001 -0.014*** 0.001 
SIZEt-1 -0.111*** 0.008 -0.130*** 0.008 
INFLt-1 0.029*** 0.009 0.009 0.008 
LTUt-1 -0.064*** 0.009 -0.046*** 0.007 
GOVt-1 -0.005*** 0.001 -0.002 0.001 
OVERALLt-1 -0.033*** 0.002 -0.033*** 0.003 
Intercept 5.185*** 0.166 6.465*** 0.515 
Observations: 19,998 19,998 
No. of banks 2,512 2,512 
Hansen test, 2nd step, χ(2), p-
value 0.039 0.388 
AB test AR(1), p-value 0.000 0.000 
AB test AR(2), p-value 0.101 0.231 
 
